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declines in farm income across all scenarios, land 
values also show decreases compared to baseline 
values. In 2004, the final year of the projection period, 
all three of the scenarios have nominal land values 
projected above what they were in 1994, though not as 
high as they would be with continuation of current 
programs. The baseline projects a 15 percent increase 
in average nominal land values from 1994 to 2004 
compared with 11.6 percent for the Marketing Loan 
option, 8.6 percent for the Revenue Assurance option. 
and 5.4 percent for the No-Program option. However. 
some regions would see nominal land values decline 
from current levels, the most severe declines being 
under a No-Program option. The implication is that 
only with the No-Program option are financial markets 
likely to be severely strained. There would be regional 
variation with elimination of commodity programs of 
course. For instance, rice net returns decline signifi-
cantly compared to a relatively modest impact on corn 
net returns. Thus, some regions would find credit 
markets strained more severely than others. 
Conclusions 
The three policy options discussed here share one 
policy continuation (CRP is continued) and one major 
policy shift (ARPs and 0/50-85/92 programs are 
elim inated). Also, as crop base restrictions are elimi-
nated, with the exception of the Marketing Loan 
option, the market drives production decisions and 
shifts of acreage between crops. For the Marketing 
Loan option, production decisions are driven by the 
loan rates rather than the market prices. Further, in all 
scenarios government stockholding is reduced and, for 
the most pan, stocks of most commodities remain low 
compared to historical pallems. 
Farm income tends to decline in all of the alternatives 
and the decline in the No-Program option is severe 
enough to generate real concerns about disruption of 
financiaVcredit sectors. Land values decline relative to 
baseline projections, but average nominal land values 
at the end of the period are higher than 1994 in all 
scenarios. It is interesting to note that in the year 
2004, even without insurance indemnities or 
nonmonetary risk reduction benefits included in the 
analysis, net farm income is highest for the Revenue 
Assurance alternative. And if increased insurance 
benefits are added, net farm income, plus increased 
insurance benefits under this plan, recovers to levels 
close to the baseline and at a much lower cost to the 
U.S. government. 
Risky Business: Measuring Monetary 
and Nonmonetary Benefits of 
Insurance Programs 
(Darnell B. Smith, 5151294-1184) 
(Dermot]. Hayes, Associate Professor of Economics, 
5151294-6217) 
Because farmers are exposed to a relatively large 
amount of business risk, aspects of government farm 
programs designed to remove or reduce risk can be of 
particular imponance. Given a choice between a very 
risky activity and a slightly less profitable activity with 
much lower risk, many farmers (or their bankers) will 
choose the less risky activity. These aspects of pro-
grams can be viewed in t.enns of having a direct 
monetary impact on expected profi tability, and an 
indirect, very illusive, nonmonetary impact on pro-
ducer welfare. In the final analysis, it may not be 
preferable to have programs that increase expected 
profitability but also increase volatility in a producer's 
cash flow. lt may be more desirable to have a program 
that results in slightly lower levels of expected profit-
ability but reduces cash flow volatility and reduces 
producer risk. 
It is very difficuiL to incorporate these risk effects into 
policy models because il is impossible to anticipate 
weather patterns and other sources of risk over the 
projection period. However, if we completely ignore 
these risk effects, policy analysis results will be biased 
against programs that are designed primarily to reduce 
risk. A comparable situation exists if one is evaluating 
two employment opportunities that have the same 
salary but only one provides full medical insurance 
coverage. The income numbers are the same, but the 
full remuneration package is much different. This 
issue is particularly important to the revenue assurance 
farm bill proposal because, under this plan, in an 
"average" year (i.e., the type of year incorporated in 
most projections and baselines), no farmer would 
receive a cash payment, but the risk structure is much 
d1fferent. 
For Iowa's agricultural producers and rural communi-
ties, this question translates into, "Is the value of a 
doUar's worth of government payments received in bad 
crop years when cash flow is sLrai ned any different 
from a dollar in payments made in good years when 
cash is more abundant?" Technically, the answer to 
this question is that a dollar is just a dollar. However, 
if we remember the floods of 1993, the underlying 
value of disaster payments that prevented financial 
chaos for families all over the Midwest was higher than 
if that same amount of money were to be transferred 
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today. The subsequent question is how does one go 
about measuring the benefits associated with risk 
transfer or reduction? 
How to Measure Risk Reduction 
The method economists use to measure the benefits of 
risk reduction revolves around how much individuals 
would be willing to pay to have their risk eliminated or 
reduced. To do this, we calculate the amount of 
money typical producers would be wil ling tO accept for 
certain in exchange for the risky outcome they might 
otherwise face. For example, suppose a farmer expectS 
to make an average of $50,000 per year raising hogs, 
but would be just as happy making $45,000 per year 
rais ing hogs if all the revenue uncen ainty associated 
with raising hogs were eliminated. Then we can say 
that the certainty equivalent of a $50,000 per year hog 
operation is $45,000. Here $50,000 is the exp ected 
average revenue and $45,000 is the "certainty equiva-
lent" return. 
This situation is similar to the common practice of 
purchasing homeowners insurance. Even though 
homeowners pay in far more in premiums than they 
ever expect to collect in indemnities, the value of risk 
reduction outweighs the costs. Because the risk 
associated with even one occurrence has the potential 
to be catas trophic, people generally are willing to pay 
premiums over and above indemnities in order to 
reduce risk. 
These concepts have implications for the interpretation 
of results presented in the previous article on fann bill 
analysis. All three of the scenarios analyzed and 
discussed in the previous article have fundamentally 
different risk structures for producers. Yet, due to the 
inherent difficulty of measuring benefits of risk 
reduction , no measure of changes In producer risk was 
provided, nor did we indicate how producer welfare is 
impacted by these changes. This, again, is equivalent 
to comparing job salaries but not inquiring about 
health insurance coverage. 
Revenue Assurance Benefits 
To partially compensate for these dirficulties, research-
ers at CARD have utilized s tandard procedures in 
economics to evaluate how a "typical" Iowa farmer 
would benefit from a Revenue Assurance program. 
This research shows that, at the 70 percent guarantee 
level, for each dollar of government spending on 
revenue assurance, farmers generally receive at least 
two dollars worth of benefits (see CARD Briefing Paper 
Iowa Ag Review 
95-BP 7). Therefore, as a rule of thumb, revenue 
assurance benefi tS to producers can be calculated by 
multiplying the insurance indemni ties by two. 
Now, taking the FAPRJ numbers on indemnities and 
net farm income listed in the previous section and 
employing the "95-BP 7" rule of thumb, we have: 
Estimated Annual Insurance Benefits 
(calculated as two times insurance indemnities) 
Fiscal Years 1996-2000 2004 
Baseline Value $2.12 billion $2.10 billion 
Marketing Loan No Change No Change 
Revenue Assurance Up $0.94 billion Up $1.3 billion 
No-Program No Change No Change 
Average Annual Net Farm income Plus Estimated 
insurance Benefits (in dollar terms) 
Fiscal Years 1996-2000 2004 
Baseline Value $45.60 billion $54.55 billion 
Marketing Loan $44.44 billion 51.58 billion 
Revenue Assurance $43.67 bill ion $53.30 billion 
No-Program $38.71 bi Il ion $50.50 billion 
Average Annual Net Farm income Plus Estimated 
Ins urance Benefits (percent ch ange from baseline) 
Fiscal Years 1996-2000 2004 
Baseline Value $45.60 billion $54.55 billion 
Marketing Loan Down 2.5% Down 5.4% 
Revenue Assurance 
• 
Down 4.2% Down ?.3% 
No-Program Down 15.1% Down 7.4% 
The listed values illustrate that in the early years, the 
Marketing Loan program has a slightly higher com-
bined worth to producers than Revenue Assurance, 
albeit at a much higher govenuneot cost. At the end of 
the projection period, however, Revenue Assurance 
surpasses the Marketing Loan program by almost $2 
billion. Interestingly, if one makes a comparison to the 
baseline that includes government insurance benefits, 
the Revenue Assurance proposal returns benefits to 
producers s imilar to baseline values and with signiH-
can t taxpayer savings. 
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